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In this thesis a methodological approach to the determination of
the cost effectiveness of naval gunfire support is developed. Two
models are presented. The first is a linear program developed by the
Ballistics Research Laboratory, in which naval gunfire is employed
against a relatively static threat. The second is a probabilistic
model wherein the capability of naval gun systems against transient
targets is treated. Included is a discussion of the theoretical con-
siderations of the cost of naval gun systems which concludes in the
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I . INTRODUCTION
The Problem
This thesis is concerned with developing a cost-effectiveness
model for naval gunfire support . It is intended that this model be used
to analyze the alternate methods of supplying such support
. Historic-
ally, naval gunfire support has been almost exclusively associated
with amphibious operations . In this historical context the basic task
of naval gunfire support units is to support the assault of the objective.
The support role can be conveniently ordered into three chronological
phases, pre-landing, landing, and post-landing (Ref. 14, p. 1-1).
Or more specifically:
1 . Destroying or neutralizing shore installations that oppose the
approach of ships and aircraft
.
2 . Destroying or neutralizing defenses that may oppose the
landing
.
3 . Destroying or neutralizing defenses that may oppose the post-
landing advance of the landing force
.
Naval gunfire has been extensively employed in Vietnam in situa-
tions other than support of amphibious assaults . A few limited amphib-
ious assaults have been conducted in Vietnam; however, none were of
the size or complexity of landings in WWII or Inchon in Korea . Despite
this fact an increasing demand for support of ground operations by naval
units has been experienced (Ref. 9, p. 1) . Certain characteristics of
naval gunfire and aspects of counterinsurgency warfare have encouraged
its increased use in situations analogous to phase three; that is, the
destruction or neutralization of defenses opposing the advance of
ground forces
. The implication is that naval gunfire is currently being
used in roles once reserved for artillery and aircraft.
The problems inherent in coordinating the efforts of ships and
aircraft in acknowledged complementary roles in amphibious landings
were surmountable. Unfortunately, as the area of concern and the size
of the forces expands , the problems of coordination have become
increasingly complex. Cost effectiveness provides a possible means
of identifying the relative ability of ships and aircraft to perform
various tasks . It is hoped that analysis will denote relatively discrete
areas wherein ships and aircraft are substitutes; that is, where one of
the two systems demonstrates a definite superior performance ability.
In the event the systems are complementary, analysis can also be
used to distinguish specific individual roles that each system should
be assigned in order to maximize the overall effect.
Unfortunately, although considerable cost-effectiveness analysis
pertaining to aircraft weapon systems is available, comparable analy-
sis for naval gun systems is practically nonexistent (Ref . 3) . Further-
more, although analysis of artillery systems is available, sufficient
differences exist in the systems so that the usefulness of such analy-
sis is restricted to that of a guide to technique . For example, a naval
gun system consists of a ship and its armament; whereas artillery is
peculiar to land armies . In many cases there are differences in the
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types of charges and projectiles used by each system. Furthermore,
the administrative organizations that support these systems differ
vastly.
Thus a revival of interest in naval gunfire disclosed a serious lack
of quantitative knowledge of the naval gun systems . For this reason
the subject was determined to be a particularly fruitful area of study.
Background of Cost Effectiveness
Economists have long employed the phrase "scarcity of resources"
.
The notion that resources in an economy are scarce is probably not
particularly appealing; however, resources are indeed scarce, not in
the sense of anthracite coal, perhaps, but scarce in that they are not
unlimited. In a present day context, competition between defense and
nondefense programs within the federal sector seems to support this
contention in a narrower context
.
In an attempt to more efficiently utilize our limited resources
cost-effectiveness analysis has been introduced in government, par-
ticularly the defense department (Ref . 5, p. 1) . This procedure consti-
tutes the analytical core of the planning, programming and budgeting
method of fiscal control employed in defense expenditures .
Cost-effectiveness analysis can be defined as the systematic
analysis of the cost and military effectiveness of alternate methods
of accomplishing an objective in the presence of present and future
scarce resources
. As originally conceived, the role of the decision
maker is not diminished; rather the decision maker supplies the sub-
jective judgments required in assessing nonqualitative aspects and
rendering value judgments (Ref . 6, p. 183) .
Cost is a factor which must be considered, for it represents ex-
penditure of limited resources . Furthermore, weapon systems are
becoming more costly and implications of defense decisions on the
economy too vast and far reaching to be disregarded. However, costs
and capabilities must be compared . That is , the lowest cost is favor-
able only in terms of a specified level of effectiveness . For example,
in Figure 1 a number of buildings are to be destroyed . Alternatives





, respectively (c = c .) . Each alternative has the ability to
destroy a number of buildings b.
,
(i= 1 , 2 , 3, 4, b =b ). Alterna-
1 Z o
tive 2 is preferred to alternative 3, as it destroys the same number of
buildings for a smaller cost
.
An alternate approach may be employed. Suppose, for example,
a budget level c has been specified. With a budget specified the
object becomes to maximize the effectiveness the number of buildings
a system is capable of destroying . Alternative 2 is preferred to alter-
native 4, which has the same cost, as it (2) destroys more buildings .
Now consider alternative 1 and 2 . Alternative 2 is more expensive;
however, it also destroys more buildings . It might be appropriate to
ask if the additional buildings destroyed, b_ - b , is worth the addi-





















and nonqualitative aspects . These notions are best illustrated with
an example. Suppose that alternative 4, although destroying less
buildings than alternative 2 , does so in a much more spectacular
manner, thereby instilling fear in our enemies . This fear or loss of
morale illustrates the type of effect that is difficult if not impossible
to quantify.
Certain advantages are inherent in the techniques of cost-
effectiveness analysis . Such analysis will improve the decision making
process by employing a systematic presentation of alternatives and
outcomes bringing into focus costs and the effect of cost changes on
mission effectiveness
. In addition, past experience indicates that
during the course of the analysis additional alternatives often appear,
possibly due to the systematic nature of the analysis and the learning
effect experienced (Ref . 2
, p . 1) .
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Distinct disadvantages also exist. Such analysis may omit factors
of major importance or treat them improperly. Thus, although a study
may have the appearance of scientific objectivity, the results may be
severely prejudiced. For example, within programs of the size and
complexity of current major weapon systems, elements of cost and
effectiveness are frequently difficult to assess
. In such cases,
studies are often separated into smaller subsets of the original prob-
lem which are analytically more tractable
. Reference 6 deals exten-
sively with the problems of suboptimization and the opportunities for
error which can then arise. Analysts and users should never lose
sight of the fact that as the time horizon is extended, the ability to
forecast events and circumstances is degraded. In general, a study
should make note of any factors with a high degree of uncertainty and
examine the sensitivity of the results to variations in such factors
(Ref. 7, p. 9) .
Chapter II consists of a general discussion of the notion of a
scenario and the relevance of the two specific scenarios selected for
this study. In Chapter III, two effectiveness models are presented,
each of which is applicable to one of two scenarios chosen. Theoreti-
cal and practical considerations of the effectiveness of naval gunfire
provides motivation for the models chosen. Chapter IV discusses
factors that must be taken into account in developing the cost of a
weapon system . The results of Chapters III and IV are then married
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to provide the cost effectiveness comparison of naval gunfire support,
the central theme of the thesis . The presentation concludes with
recommended areas of further study.
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II . SCENARIO
A comparison of the effectiveness of alternative weapon systems
is not particularly meaningful unless some frame of reference or environ-
ment is prescribed. For example, consider a sprinter who runs a 100-
yard dash in the rain and on a muddy track . It would be difficult to
compare this sprinter with another who ran the same race on a clear
day with perfect conditions
. Conversely, if the two sprinters run the
same race under the same conditions, the notion that their respective
times provides some measure of their comparative abilities is intui-
tively appealing
.
The set of conditions referred to above is called a scenario in
cost-effectiveness analysis. In the most formal sense, a scenario
is as in the setting of a play wherein the time, location, and other
conditions environing and affecting the agents are specified; i.e.,
the entire set of the essential conditions or of the attendant facts
that bear on the subject are specified. Therefore, in order to achieve
a basis for comparison of alternative weapon systems, it is necessary
to examine the performance (or effectiveness) of competing systems
under the same circumstances or within the same scenario.
The use of a scenario to compare effectiveness permits param-
eterization of the uncertainty inherent in the environment . It is con-
ceivable that weapon systems may experience employment at some
time in the future under circumstances which were not considered
particularly appropriate at the time of the system's inception. By
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constructing various scenarios, it becomes possible to examine per-
formance under a great number of situations .
Within a scenario the assignment of a particular target to be fired
on shall be termed a mission. For example, a ship might be assigned
a mission to fire on a particular bridge. In the most general sense it
is possible to classify missions into two general types, bombardment
and call fire. These types will constitute the two scenarios to be
used in this analysis .
Bombardment Scenario
The bombardment scenario in this study is defined as consisting
of those missions which are of a prearranged or scheduled nature.
A specific target is to be neutralized in so far as its military potential
is concerned. For example, a bridge is to have a span dropped,
buildings are to be destroyed ( wall caved in and roof collapsed) ,
roads are to be cratered so as to prevent the movement of men and
materials . The benefits of such missions are not expected to have an
immediate effect on the enemy's ability to wage war but are more
strategic in nature. To further specify the scenario the only friendly
forces involved in the bombardment are naval forces . Such missions
are expected to occur primarily in such locations as North Vietnam,
since guerilla or insurgent forces traditionally avoid fixed positions .
A few exceptions might exist in areas where guerillas have enjoyed
control for a period of several months that is a sufficient length of
time to permit construction of tunnel complexes and staging areas .
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Call Fire Scenario
The call fire scenario in this study is defined as those missions
fired in support of (at the request of) friendly or allied forces which
are in direct contact with enemy units (allied forces are firing on
enemy forces)
. The primary features of this scenario are the lack of
fixed positions by either side and the necessity for providing sup-
porting fire as quickly as possible to allied forces . For example,
consider the situation where an allied patrol is ambushed by enemy
forces
. The ambushing forces may have time to dig shallow foxholes
for machine guns and similar positions but will not have the advantage
of well constructed mortar or artillery positions . Natural cover afforded
by features of the terrain will also be available to ambushing forces
and will be the only protection to the allied forces which are under
attack. Another example of missions falling in this scenario would be
those cases in which enemy forces attack the perimeter of an allied
base. It has been shown that in such cases as these, where the posi-
tion of one force is known and the position of the other force is only
approximately known, the rate at which ambushing forces inflict
casualties on the force that was ambushed is considerably in excess
of the rate at which the ambushed force inflicts casualties on the
ambushing force (Ref . 4) .
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Mission Attributes
Within each scenario missions exhibit additional attributes of
degree of natural cover, degree of hardness (concrete or dirt) , and
physical dimensions
.
The degree of natural cover may be further subdivided into heavy,
moderate, and light. Heavy cover includes such terrain as dense
tropical rain forests where heavy undergrowth and large trees are
predominant. Moderate cover refers to wooded areas existing in
temperate climes, e.g., North America and central Europe. Light
cover denotes sparsely wooded areas or areas of infrequent and irreg-
ular vegetation including open areas where only grass and shrubs offer
cover. Empirical observation has supported the intuitively appealing
notion that a dense rain forest will smother the effects of the explosion
and fragmentation of projectiles . Regrettably, the quantative aspects
of variations in cover, although under investigation, are not yet known
(Ref . 8
, p . 8) .
The following Figure 2 lists examples of missions and variations
of the attributes of hardness and physical dimensions (Ref. 1, p. 3) .

























Some analysis of the quantative effect of naval guns on such structures
is available from supporting arms evaluation centers; however, it is
primarily theoretical in nature and is not well supported by empirical
observation or experiments (Ref. 9, p. 11).
Distribution of Missions
Mission distribution denotes the relative frequency with which
particular missions, including attributes, occur. For example, in the
call fire scenario all missions might occur in either heavy or moderate
cover equally divided between each and further equally divided between
soft, medium, and hard area targets. Or, using figures to illustrate
the foregoing, from a total of 60 missions we could expect 30 each in
heavy and moderate cover with 10 soft, 10 medium, and 10 hard targets
in heavy and moderate cover, respectively.
For the current conflict in Vietnam there is no necessity for specu-
lation on the initial distribution of missions in the bombardment
scenario, for by definition, missions are scheduled and must be known
to be scheduled . The location and characteristics or attributes of
targets constituting potential missions would be determined from
intelligence sources
.
However, since a study may be conducted
several years before a particular conflict occurs, an effort must be
made to remain abreast of changing features of areas in which future
wars may erupt
. Uncertainty will arise since intelligence involves
estimating and projecting into the future.
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After a war begins and naval gunfire is employed, it is reasonable
to expect the distribution of missions to change as the time horizon is
extended. It would be difficult, it is true, for major support facilities
to be moved or their characteristics significantly altered . Certain
facilities are greatly dependent on features of terrain which are stable
.
An example would be transhipment points where supplies are trans-
ferred from ships or barges to trucks for further movement. Such an
area would require roads for the trucks and hydrographic conditions
suitable for ships to land or transfer supplies . Nevertheless, changes
will occur. Where possible, targets would probably be moved further
inland out of the range of naval guns . If movement of a target were
not feasible, it would most likely be more heavily fortified either
offensively (shore batteries) and/or defensively (camouflage or bun-
kers) . Elements which constitute a target would probably be dispersed
to create an area target of what had previously been a point or linear
target, for example, storing ammunition in smaller quantities and more
widely separated ^positions . All of these actions tend to make a tar-
get more difficult to destroy, thus impeding the accomplishment of a
mission. Figures 3,4, and 5 indicate the behavior of mission distri-
bution that may be expected as the time horizon is extended. In this
analysis no attempt is made to do more than predict the general direc-
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The call fire scenario is more limited than the bombardment
scenario in that fewer of the potential attributes of missions can occur
because of the restrictions imposed on the availability of fixed in-
stallations to the enemy and the inherent mobility of insurgent forces .
These requirements will, most likely, result in primarily anti-personnel
missions with perhaps a few anti -artillery missions
. Because of the
transient nature of the missions, determining the initial distribution
will be somewhat more difficult than in the case of the bombardment
scenario . The most recent information on contact with enemy units
and accurate intelligence regarding enemy intentions would be required
to determine the initial distribution . In the case of a study pertaining
to a potential conflict, information regarding the nature of a possible
enemy's combat unit organization would be most beneficial, e .g .
,
unit size, type of weapons carried, and tactics.
Since the initial information regarding mission distribution harbors
an element of doubt, the ability to predict future distributions is de-
graded . The problem of predicting the future is lessened somewhat
due to the fact that there are fewer mission attributes to worry about.
For example, referring to Figure 2, only exposed artillery and personnel
in offensive, defensive, or prone postures should be encountered.
Where naval gunfire support is employed it would be reasonable to
expect enemy units to avoid contact if within range of these guns .
21
Thus, occurrence of missions as a function of distance from the coast
would be expected to exhibit the same behavior as in the case of the
bombardment scenario (See Figure 3) .
22
Ill . EFFECTIVENESS
As was previously mentioned, cost-effectiveness analysis is
designed to compare the cost and effectiveness of alternative weapons
systems . More specifically, the objective of this analysis is to pre-
sent in a systematic fashion the cost and effectiveness of alternate
choices of weapon systems . In this study a naval gunfire support
weapon system is defined as a group or combination of ships assigned
to provide such gunfire support. In practice, ships would be assigned
to a task unit which is charged with providing supporting fire . Assign-
ments are frequently only temporary; however, for our purposes here
they will be assumed to remain constant for the duration of the analy-
sis of a particular group. In other words, substitution of ships of the
same type does not affect the analysis; only the task unit composition
is significant
.
It is the purpose of this chapter to develop a means of determining
the ability of a weapon system to produce a desired effect. Desired
effect is considered to be the accomplishment of a mission. In a
broader sense it could also mean the accomplishment of several
missions
. Recall that the assignment of a ship to fire on a particular
target achieving a specified effect, dropping a span, etc., constitutes
a mission
.
It was determined that missions could be placed into two general
categories
,
which were then defined as the two scenarios . Within
each of the scenarios, accomplishment of a mission has a different
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meaning or connotation. In the bombardment scenario, accomplishment
of a mission means the destruction of all targets constituting missions
falling within this scenario. In the call fire scenario, accomplishment
of a mission means a target is brought under fire. For example, a ship
is ordered to proceed to a particular target and fire on it (this , of
course, constitutes a mission)
.
This mission is considered accom-
plished as soon as the ship succeeds in placing a round within 100
yards* of the target
.
It may happen that several of the alternative weapon systems
examined are capable of accomplishing the same mission. This is
particularly so in the call fire scenario, for the requirement of placing
a round within 100 yards of a target is not particularly stringent. In
fact, the only foreseeable impediment to the accomplishment of this
mission would be that a target is simply out of range . It will be seen
that this does occur in some cases . Thus there must be some means
of differentiating between weapon systems which accomplish the same
objective, i.e., destroying the same target, and some measure of
respective abilities to achieve this desired effect. This measure is
usually referred to as a measure of effectiveness . Since the measure
of effectiveness is closely related to the accomplishment of the ob-
jective, it should not be surprising that the two scenarios have
different measures of effectiveness .
*This distance was chosen arbitrarily as representative of the proximity
required to force attacking forces to adopt a defensive posture .
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Measures of Effectiveness
In the bombardment scenario the measure of effectiveness is the
number of times that a particular weapon system can defeat a specified
threat. For example, a ship has available a certain amount of ammuni-
tion and is to destroy six bridges . The number of times the ship can
defeat the specified threat is that number of times the six bridges
could be destroyed with the amount of ammunition the ship has avail-
able . The specified threat will be that threat currently in existence
and against which alternative weapon systems will be examined to
determine which combination of ships can defeat the threat the
greatest number of times
.
In the call fire scenario the measure of effectiveness chosen is
the length of time required for a weapon system to place a round
within 100 yards of a target. The necessity for rapid accomplishment
of the mission in this scenario has been discussed. Since the empha-
sis is on rapidity of results, the most effective alternative is that one
which accomplishes the mission in the least amount of time .
A measure of effectiveness, though unquestionably valuable,
often conceals many of the more esoteric aspects of the situation
which is being analyzed. Admittedly it is possible to become so
familiar with the practical aspects of a problem that a fresh look is
difficult. It is equally true, however, that some appreciation of the
practical side of the problem will permit an analyst to recognize
25
areas where assumptions can simplify the procedure without robbing
the analysis of practical value. Practical considerations will be




Naval gun systems consist of both the type of armament (gun)
installed on a ship and the ship itself. If discussion is restricted
to ships and guns currently in inventory, which it is here, it is not
useful to discuss the two separately. For example, in the call fire
scenario, the ability of a ship to accomplish a mission depends on
whether the gun is of long enough range to reach the target and how
fast the ship can move to put the gun within range of the target
.
Therefore, a naval gun system is defined as a ship and its installed
guns .* Several characteristics which distinguish between naval gun
systems are available for consideration.
To begin with, some characteristics of naval gun systems are
applicable to all systems
.
Naval gun systems provide a variety of
calibers often on the same ship. This permits a more flexible re-
sponse . For example, it would not be necessary to fire on a junk
with a 16-inch gun, since either the 5-inch or the 40 -MM gun also
installed are capable of destroying a junk, may be operated by fewer
personnel, and cost less to fire. In addition there are available
*The same procedure could be applied to hypothetical systems .
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different types of projectiles and fuzes adding more flexibility. The
initial velocity of naval guns is higher than artillery which results in
superior material penetration of the target
. Coupled with the higher
relative muzzle velocity is a flatter trajectory and a fall of shot
pattern which is narrow in deflection (across the line of fire) and long
in range (along the line of fire) . Because of these factors more accu-
rate fire is possible against targets presenting a face verticle to the





Shipboard fire control systems are sophisticated. Such systems
permit fire while the ship is moving and in the case of larger ships,
such as cruisers, two or more missions may be conducted simultan-
eously. In addition, optical and electronic equipment make possible
observation of targets when an unobstructed line of sight exists per-
mitting direct fire by the ship. Within the limits imposed by hydro-
graphic conditions, firing ships may be continuously positioned to
provide support for units which are themselves mobile. In addition,
ships may maneuver to avoid counterbattery or other attack. These
points require elaboration since there is evidence indicating that
these are to a large extent responsible for the heavy use of naval
gunfire in Vietnam . In counterinsurgency warfare the emphasis is
on mobility with small unit actions spread throughout the country-
side . Conventional artillery has some serious drawbacks in such a
situation. Artillery is vulnerable to enemy counteraction (attack)
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and time is required to establish communications with spotters and
achieve positions from which support may be provided to forward units .
The very existence of artillery in an area may very well cause the
enemy to avoid or break contact. Such a result as this is counter to
the most basic precepts of counterinsurgency warfare where it is de-
sired to force the generally weaker, numerically, insurgent forces to
fight a more or less conventional engagement. Finally, the ability to
reprovision ships on station permits uninterrupted availability.
Individual gun systems possess factors which may distinguish
between systems. Some examples of these factors are ship speed,
cruising radius, draft, armament, magazine capability, gun range,
and armor. The effect of variations in cruising radius was ignored
since ships can be fueled en route or on station, and the speeds of
ships that provide the majority of naval gunfire support services are
approximately equal (Ref . 9
, p . 11). The effect of variations in draft
were found to be insignificant for a Vietnam locale (See Appendix A) .
The effects of differences in armament are many and varied . Guns
of longer range can complete missions beyond the range of guns of
lesser range. Furthermore, guns of greater range can provide sup-
porting fire over a greater area of land . Thus long range guns reduce
the time required to provide gun fire support since no physical move-
ment of the ship is required. Longer range guns also fire heavier pro-
jectiles which have commensurately more lethal effect; that is, in
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general it takes less of the heavy projectiles to accomplish the same
mission (Ref. 9, p. 11) .
Magazine capacity is of particular importance to smaller ships
which are frequently limited in their storage capacity. Specifically,
greater magazine capacity permits a ship to remain on station providing
supporting fire for a longer period of time
.
Armor refers to the structural members (plates) of a ship which are
designed to deflect enemy shells . Considerable differences exist
between ships
.
For example, battleships are quite heavily armored,
whereas destroyers have practically no armor whatsoever. Of course,
the presence of armor decreases the vulnerability of ships to counter-
action (counterbattery fire or torpedoes) . This aspect will not be con-
sidered here except for the inclusion of escorts to be considered in
the next chapter
.
Bombardment Scenario Effectiveness Model
The number of times a weapon system can defeat (destroy) a spe-
cific threat was chosen as the measure of effectiveness in the bom-
bardment scenario. One method of determining the number of times
the threat can be defeated is to employ a mathematical programming
model. Here a linear program developed by the Ballistics Research
Laboratory will be used . The model chosen employs the following
symbology:
29
T. - denotes the j-th mission class; j = 1 ... 81
f. - denotes the number of missions in the j-th class
J
w. - denotes weapon type, i = 1 ... 3




n. - denotes the number of rounds available for w,
i l
x.. - denotes the number of targets of the j-th class assigned
to w.
i
Consideration in this formulation will be restricted to three types of
naval gun systems w. ; i = 1, 2, and 3 with ranges r. ; 1=1,2,
and 3, respectively. Further r < r < r .
Referring to the figure outlining mission categories, or classes,
it will be seen that there are 27 possible combinations of categories .
Since any particular mission can occur in each and every range band
(0 ,r ) , (r , r ) , or (r , r ) , the index j will vary from 1 to 81 .
T through T denotes all possible combinations occurring within
the (0,r ) band. These missions may be fired by any of the weapons
considered. T_ through T,.. denotes the possible combinations
2o 54
occurring in the range band (r , r ) . These missions may be fired
only by weapons two and three (w. ,wj . Finally, T cc through T ,
Z o bo ol
denotes missions occurring between ranges (r ,r ) . These missions
may be fired only by weapon three (w ) .
The number of rounds (n.) available for w. will be based on the
i i
number of naval gun systems which constitute the weapon system and
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the total number of rounds contained in all the ships that constitute
the weapon system that can be used by w. . For example, consider a
weapon system composed of a cruiser and a destroyer. The destroyer
carries w and the cruiser w and w . In this case, n will be
the number of rounds of ammunition for w carried by both the des-
troyer and the cruiser. The number of rounds n for use by w are
those available in the cruiser.
Relatively strong assumptions are employed in defining the number
of rounds (r.
.) required to defeat T. with w. to facilitate the solu-
tion of the linear program. In actual fact, r is an increasing
function of range . Since range bands have been employed, r.. will
be assumed constant for a particular range band. The constant value
used will be that which exists at the midpoint of the band, that is,





T oo at range — • *n the event T. is out of range of
1 , Zo 1 , 2o 2 J
w. ; r.. = M, where M is an arbitrary large positive number. Some
1 ij
mention should be made of the fact that the pattern of the fall of shot
at the target is probabilistic and usually described by the bivariate
normal distribution (Ref . 8, p. 198) . The impact of this behavior is
a variation in the number of rounds required to defeat a threat . The
mean value was chosen to represent r,
. . That is, r Q = r at




. An alternate procedure might be to determine the
2
number of rounds (R) so that a subjective confidence statement of
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9 5% could be made that no more than R rounds will be required to
destroy the target . For example, assume r.. at range _2 L is
X J 200
distributed according to f(r) and that P(r.. £ R) = f(r)dr = .95*.
R
Use R = r.. as a deterministic estimate of r,. . Thus there exists
a subjective confidence of 9 5% that no more than R rounds will be
required to defeat T. .
The formulation of the linear program follows:
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The values of K and x.. are not to be restricted to integers. By
introducing the slack variables L. , i = 1 , . . . , m , we obtain the
following linear equations:
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which is equivalent to
1/iij min[rnxn + r^x + . . + r. x. + L_]Is Is 1 J (6)















A = (a..) is the coefficient matrix
ij
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Any standard linear programming algorithm can be used to solve this
problem .
Call Fire Scenario Effectiveness Model
Recall that in the call fire scenario the measure of effectiveness
is the time required to take a target under fire, or, more specifically,
the object is to fire on a target as quickly as possible. It is assumed
that missions are distributed according to f (x,y)* over the area
XY
shown in Figure 6a
.
The approach will be to minimize a function
g(X, Yja^b. ,c.) representing the time required to take a target under
fire when that target occurs at position X,Y and where a.,b., and c,
1 ; i
represent stationing positions of destroyers, cruisers, and battleships,
respectively. The problem may then be represented as:
L r




















* Y * r
3
The nature of the function g(X, Y,a. ,b. ,c.) must be determined.
In the figure the time for a ship stationed at point a to move to a
position from which a target occurring at X,Y may be fired on is equal
*Reference 12, p. 193-197 discusses the theory and notation of a joint
random phenomena (the occurrence of a target in this context) .






Targets occur in the area according to f v(x /Y) • X and Y are randomX, Y
variables signifying the coordinates of a target . Ships stationed at
a, b, and c can fire on that portion of the area that is shaded.
f X,Y
FIGURE 6b
A ship stationed at point a must move to point a' in order to fire
on the target at position X,Y.
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to -! L where s represents the ship's speed (See Figure 6b).
2 ? 2
From the figure r = Y + (X - a')
v ,2 v2,l/2a = X - (r - Y )
or the time required for a ship stationed at point a to reach a position
from which a target occurring at X,Y may be fired on is
|






The time required to commence fire once within range is assumed to be
negligible compared to the time required to move the ship. In the same
fashion the times required for ships stationed at points b and c are
|X-(r^-Y2 ) l/2 -b| | X -(r2 -Y2 ) l/2 -c|
and respectively.
Any mission occurring in the range band (0,r ) can be fired on
by any of the three types of ships , whereas targets between r and r
are within range only of cruisers and battleships . Finally targets
between r
9
and r are within reach of the battleship only. Thus,
the function g(X, Y,a. ,b. ,c.) becomes
g (X,Y,a,b,c) = - min <
g
2




, lx _ (r2_ Y2 )
l/2
-a




- Y ) - c
v .2 2 1/2 ,X - (r - Y ) - b




- Y ) - c
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Numerous methods are avilable for obtaining the minimum to h(a,b,c)
and no particular method is suggested here. The classical procedure
would be to take the appropriate partial derivatives (— , —r- , -— ) ,
^a db 9c
set each equal to zero and solve the resulting set of simultaneous r.
equations
. The second order conditions must be checked to assure
the proper extreme is obtained . The decision rule is to select that
combination of naval gun systems (ships) that provides the minimum
expected time late for a specified budget. This technique, although
conceptually straightforward, becomes exceedingly cumbersome for





The cost of an alternative is an integral part of cost-effectiveness
analysis. As has been previously mentioned, cost represents expendi-
ture of limited resources . If a greater cost is incurred than necessary
to accomplish an objective, it is conceivable that somewhere there
exists an objective for which insufficient resources will be available.
The object of this chapter, then, is to develop a means of determining
the cost of naval gun systems .
Relevance of Historical Cost
The cost of a naval gun system is not always composed of the cost
of the research and development, investment, and operating cost. For
example, the research and development cost of an existing system is
not considered in comparing alternatives
. The money has been spent
and is presumably irretrievable . Only expenditures that occur pursuant
to a choice of a particular alternative are considered. In other words,
sunk or historical cost should not be included
.
The notion of sunk cost has been extensively treated in the
accounting and economic literature, notably in Reference 5, and is
basic to analysis designed to distinguish between alternatives .
Further discussion of the theoretical aspects concerning exclusion of
sunk cost will be omitted .
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Categories of Costs
A summary of cost categories which should be reviewed to select
pertinent costs may be found in Reference 10 . An example of a cost
model for the total cost of a naval gun system is shown in Figure 7 .
Of the items listed only a few are incurred as a direct result of the
decision to employ a ship in a naval gunfire role . Remaining costs
are independent of such a decision; that is, they are incurred regard-
less of a decision concerning employment. Selecting the appropriate
categories is only part of the solution and several aspects of each
category must be considered in more depth
.
It is possible that there may be more than one cost applicable to
ammunition .If it were decided that current stocks of ammunition would
be expended without replacement, the proper cost would be either
zero, assuming no opportunity cost for existing stocks, or the cost of
overhauling overage units prior to issue and use, whichever was
applicable. However, if expended ammunition is to be replaced, the
cost would be the overhaul cost (if applicable) and the cost of newly
manufactured replacement ammunition . Either method of costing
ammunition is appropriate depending on the circumstances . The latter
method is probably the most likely.
Operating costs should be included if particular naval gun systems
represent additions to the operating forces as a result of activation of
mothballed units
. This operating cost would be reduced by subtracting
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INVESTMENT
a . SCN Cost per Ship
1 . New Construction
2 . Conversion
b. OPN
1 . Fram II
2 . Alternation per Ship
3 . Expendable Ordnance
c. S&F Cost
1 . Fram II Equipment Investment per Ship
2 . Fram II Rehabilitation per Ship
3 . Alternation Installation per Overhaul
d . PAMN Missiles
OPERATING
I . Direct Costs
a . Ship Personnel Pay and Allowances
b . Medical Care
c
. O&M Ships and Facilities
1 . Regular Overhaul
2 . Non-Scheduled Repair
3 . Supplies and Equipage
4 . Fuel and Utilities
d. OPN-SSE Maintenance Material




a . Military Personnel Pay and Allowances for
Training and Other Support Personnel
FIGURE 7
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housekeeping cost of mothballed ships . The operating costs of ships
currently in the operating forces will be incurred regardless of a de-
cision concerning employment and can be disregarded in this analysis
.
Activation costs are of course peculiar . to ships which must be
drawn from the reserve fleet and are differential costs due to the de-
cision to employ mothballed ships in a naval gunfire support role
.
Finally, the opportunity cost must be considered. In the neo-
classical economic literature opportunity cost is defined as the maxi-
mum amount which a good or service could yield if applied to some
other purpose . It has been argued (Ref . 13) that in the event a viable
alternative mission exists
, i.e., a mission which would be undertaken
if the naval gunfire mission were cancelled, the costs of performing the
alternative mission will substitute for the benefits which would be
realized. Implicit in this statement is the assumption that costs and
benefits are commensurable. These same benefits are,then, the oppor-
tunity cost of pursuing the naval gunfire mission to the exclusion of
the alternate mission. This argument can be extended to show that
the costs of the alternate mission represent only the lower bound on
the benefits which would accrue from the alternate mission. Consider
some of the alternative missions which may occur.
1 . Coastal surveillance and junk patrol
2 . Search and rescue
3 . Escort
4 . Port visit
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To show that at least a minimum is represented is straightforward. If
the benefits of a mission did not at least equal the costs, the mission
would not be undertaken. This, of course, assumes the decision
maker is behaving in an optimal fashion. Demonstrating that the costs
may provide only a lower bound requires a closer examination. The
costs of a mission such as search and rescue would probably be
closely approximated by the operating cost if it is assumed the ship
would be engaged in a port visit were it not for the search and rescue
mission. In this case, operating cost refers to the cost of expendibles
used by a ship underway, fuel, etc . Since the alternative is to do
nothing, operating cost is generally used in a broader sense, including
such items as pay and allowances for the crew; however, the usage
here is more restricted. So assuming that the operating costs approxi-
mate the cost of a mission, what are the benefits? The benefits of a
search and rescue mission are the saving of lives . The costs and
benefits are not commensurable; however, the value of a human life is
certainly worth the price of expendibles used in steaming and probably
a lot more. For example, the value of a human life is presumably
worth at least the amount it costs to train a replacement and probably
a lot more . Similar arguments can be employed for the other alternate
missions with the outcome of each attempting to relate operating cost
to human life. Thus, there seems to be no completely satisfactory
simple means of determining the opportunity cost of missions alternate
to naval gunfire missions
.
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A possible answer to this dilemma might be to employ a mathe-
matical programming model to allocate ships to the various types of
missions for which they are suited using the dual variables, sometimes
called the internal prices , as estimates of the opportunity cost or the
worth of the next ship in a particular employment* . Reference 9 pro-
vides one method of dealing with this particular area of incommensur-
ability (human life) .
Therefore, the weapon system cost is composed of the cost of the
ammunition, operating cost (if applicable) , activation cost (if applica-
ble)
,
and opportunity cost. Specifically, the operating cost might be
the daily cost times the number of days the weapon system will be
engaging the specified threat. The activation cost might be represented
by
no . of days system will engage specified threat activation
estimated total days in remaining lifetime cost
prorating the activation cost over the remaining lifetime . This tech-
nique is applicable only to studies that occur before the fact (activa-
tion)
. Once activation is initiated the cost becomes a sunk cost and
is omitted from further differential cost analysis .
Assuming successful resolution of the opportunity cost problem,
the opportunity cost would be given by the number of missions existing
in the specified threat times the maximum opportunity cost from among
alternate missions .





Cost effectiveness was previously defined as the systematic
analysis of the cost and effectiveness of alternate methods of accom-
plishing an objective. Of course, what is meant is that costs and
effectiveness are to be simultaneously compared and that comparison
is to be the subject of this chapter.
In a graph of effectiveness as a function of cost it classically













With the aid of analysis users are able to determine the effectiveness
of a specific budget expenditure or the cost necessary to provide a
particular level of effectiveness
.
Furthermore, repeating a portion of
the argument in Chapter I, it is possible to express the additional
cost necessary, c - c , to increase the effectiveness from e to
e . As the curve indicates, the law of diminishing marginal returns*
applies as it becomes increasingly costly to improve the effectiveness
*It is not entirely clear that this does in fact represent diminishing
marginal returns as opposed to diminishing returns to scale.
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by some increment Ae . Now the behavior of effectiveness vs . cost
in the specific situations considered herein must be examined.
Bombardment Scenario
It can be shown that a curve of the number of times (K) a threat
can be defeated will have the general behavior shown in Figure 0j(see
Appendix B) .
K
Total Weapon System Cost
FIGURE 9
Actually, the curve is composed of a series of straight line segments;
however, the macroscopic behavior is as shown. In order to develop
the curve it is necessary to determine (K) for various budget levels .
It should be noted that a specified budget level can result in more than
one value of (K) . In fact, it may happen that one value of (K) can
be found for each possible combination of naval gun systems that the
budget level is capable of funding . For example, if the budget level
were 10 units and naval gun systems cost 1,2, and 3 units, respect-
ively, it would be possible to fund any one of the following combina-
tions of naval gun systems:
46
10 of system 1 or
5 of system 2 or
3 of system 3 or
1 of system 1 , etc .
Some combination^ ) of naval gun systems will yield a maximum value
for (K) . That this is so may be illustrated by considering the com-
bination of 10 of system 1 . If system 1 was the system having a maxi-
mum range r
,
it would not be possible for system 1 to obtain even a
(K) of l,for some targets would be out of range . One aspect of the
behavior of effectiveness vs . cost requires some additional considera-
tion
. Absent is the diminishing marginal returns behavior illustrated
in Figure 8 . If, in fact, the ability to defeat the threat on the 20-30
confrontation is just as important as the 0-10 time, the law of
diminishing marginal returns does not apply. In truth, however, the
ability to defeat the threat a great number of times is probably not
interesting. In this case, a curve of effectiveness versus K would







One method of displaying graphically the results of the call fire
scenario model is shown in Figure 13 (see page 50) . As in the pre-
ceeding model, a specified budget level can yield more than one com-
bination of naval gun systems; thus, several values for expected time
late may result. The curve is developed from the least of these values
,
in this context synonymous with most effective. Varying the budget
level will provide a profile of expected time late
.
Caution should be exercised when using a criterion involving ex-
pected value
. The behavior of a random variable about its mean (jj,)
can vary considerably depending upon the underlying distribution.
For example, in Figure 11, the case of a normal distribution with a small
variance, the behavior is generally good and the expected value is a






However, in the case of a bimodal distribution, as shown in Figure 12,
the expected value is of little value and should be avoided .
f'(x)
FIGURE 12
If the number of targets is assumed to be large compared to the
number of ships, the distribution of time late may be approximated by
the normal distribution (Ref . 12, p. 238) . By computing the variance
of time late, a confidence interval, shown by the dotted lines, can be
constructed about the expected value, thus providing subjective con-
fidence regarding the upper and lower limits of the time late which can


























The convergent behavior may be substantiated by letting t. = time late
for replication (i)
,
(i = 1 , 2 , . . . , n) of a particular weapon system
confronting a specified threat. Then F, the mean of the random sample,
2
is normally distributed with mean n and variance a /n . As n — « ,
2
a /n — . Thus , the confidence region will exhibit the converging
behavior shown (Ref. 8, p. 226) .
As was mentioned, the foregoing presents a methodological
approach that has general application to naval gunfire . Although the
approach here was undoubtedly influenced by the current was in
Vietnam, effort was made to remain sufficiently general to preclude
early obsolescence of the procedures developed. One interesting area
of application of this work would be the determination of an optimal
weapon suit for a new class ship designed primarily to provide gunfire
support . An additional area worthy of further effort is the determination
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of a suitable allocation model for combat forces and one that would,
as a side benefit, yield the opportunity costs mentioned. Finally,
the problem of incommensurability of costs and benefits (value of
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APPENDIX A
A procedure that can be employed to determine the effect of varia-




The figures 1, 3, 5, etc., are found on hydrographic charts and
represent the depth of the water in fathoms . Determine the limiting
draft (the shallowest water into which a ship can safely proceed) for
the particular ship under consideration and connect the figures signi-
fying that limiting draft, e.g., 5 fathoms . Strike a series of arcs from
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this limiting draft line with a radius equal to the range of the gun being
considered . By connecting the arcs which extend the farthest from the
coast, an envelope of the land within range of the naval gun can be
determined. Of course, different ships have different gun ranges and
limiting drafts
. By repeating this procedure for different ships , a
comparison of the portion of the countryside within range of the guns
of various ships was made . It was discovered that in only two loca-
tions could a destroyer fire further inland than a cruiser or battleship





It has been asserted that K behaves linearly as the size of
weapon systems is increased. This appendix will be a proof of this
assertion. Assume that m = s = 2, the program can then be written
r r
11 12 1 _ ,.,
min — x
T rf,;+
— x + — L (1)
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and x.. ;> , L. ^ for all i and j
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subject to n r u + y
u X X X



























, y, , y? unrestricted
.
Equations (5) and (6) result from associating u, y and y with the
X L»
first, second, and third variables in equation (4), respectively.

































then y. = y = .
n n *1 7 2
Therefore, in order that y > and y > , it must hold that u >
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From this complimentary slackness implies that L = L = .
J- L*



















It is not obvious that (8) and (9) are consistent; nevertheless the
primal can be written
r r
11 12 1 _
min x,. + x, _ + — L.






































Thus, the primal actually has only one restraint and, hence, only
one of the variables in (11) can be positive. If x = x = L =0 ,
then L
?
< which violates the requirement that L
?
^
. Thus L =
















































which supports the contention that K behaves linearly. Figure B-l
illustrates this behavior. On a microscopic scale K consists of a
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In this thesis a methodological approach to the determination of the cost
effectiveness of naval gunfire support is developed. Two models are presented.
The first is a linear program developed by the Ballistics Research Laboratory,
in which naval gunfire is employed against a relatively static threat . The
second is a probabilistic model wherein the capability of naval gun systems
against transient targets is treated . Included is a discussion of the theoretical
considerations of the cost of naval gun systems which concludes in the pre-
sentation of some alternatives of presenting the results of analysis of this type.
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